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Newsletter #170 A call to resist illegitimate authority November 1984 
U.S. Ready to Intervene 
in Gulf War 
JOE STORK 
MARTHA WENGER 
This article, which is reprinted from 
MERIP Reports, July-September 
1984, outlines the history of U.S. in-
volvement in the Iran-Iraq war. While 
we recognize that this article is a bit 
more "technical" than the material 
which usually appears in Resist, we felt 
it important to cover a subject which 
has been given little coverage in either 
the mainstream or the left press. As 
with the conflicts in Central America, 
this is another region where the U.S. is 
using the promise of military weapons / 
and support to bend the political tide in 
its favor. Unlike response to interven-
tion in Central America, there is little 
vocal opposition to or familiarity with 
U.S. involvement in this war. We urge 
everyone to learn more about the con-
flict in the gulf. For more information 
we recommend the special July-Sep-
tember issue of MERIP. Single copies 
are $4.50 and can be obtained by 
writing the Middle East Research and 
Information Project, Box 1247, NY, 
NY 10025. Subscriptions to MERIP 
are $18/year. - Eds. 
The current phase of the war be-
tween Iran and Iraq has prompted a 
level of U.S. military intervention in 
the Gulf region that is new and un-
precedented in both qualitative and 
quantitative terms, and holds the risk 
of a more direct combat role on Iraq's 
rn-;S Midway battle group in the Indian Ocean. 
behalf. Since early 1983, the stalemate 
in the war appeared to be working in 
Iran's favor. Its greater weight in terms 
of population and economic resources 
gave it the edge in a strategy of attri-
tion. Beginning in the fall of 1983, Iraq 
threatened to counter by attacking 
Iran's oil exporting capacity. This cam-
paign finally began in March and April 
1984, with missile attacks against oil 
tankers near Iran's Kharg Island 
loading facility. Iran's measured re-
sponse - "an eye for two eyes," as 
one U.S. official put it - forced a two 
week halt in this phase of the war, 
although Iraq resumed these attacks at 
the end of June. Iran, meanwhile, has 
had several hundred thousand com-
batants, perhaps half a million, poised 
along the southern front for another 
''final offensive.'' Most observers 
believe that whatever the differences 
within the Islamic Republic leadership 
there will indeed be one more major of-
fensive. If this offensive fails, the war 
will nevertheless go on, at least at the 
level of continued border clashes, for 
as long as the two major protagonists, 
Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini, remain in power. 
Continued on Page Three 
THE PLEDGE OF RESISTANCE 
If the United States invades, bombs, sends combat troops, or otherwise signficant-
ly escalates its intervention in Nicaragua or El Salvador, I pledge to join with 
others to engage in acts of nonviolent direct action at U.S. federal facilities, in-
lcuding U.S. federal buildings, military installations, congressional offices, of-
fices of the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and other ap-
propriate places. I pledge to engage in nonviolent civil disobedience in order to 
prevent or halt the death and destuction which such military action would cause 
for the people of Central America. 
Name (Print) _______________________ _ 
Signature _________________________ _ 
Address __________________________ _ 
City/State ___________________ Zip ___ _ 
Tel. ______________ o you need nonviolence training? __ _ 
Name of affinity group ____________________ _ 
THE PLEDGE 
OF WITNESS AND SUPPORT 
If the United States invades, bombs, sends combat troops, or otherwise 
significantly escalates its intervention in Nicaragua or El Salvador, I pledge to join 
others in protesting that miliatary action by nonviolenting vigiling at U.S. federal 
facilities and other appropriate places. I also pledge to support those who engage 
in acts of nonviolent civil disobedience in order to prevent or halt further death 
and destruction in Central America. 
Name (Print) ______________________ _ 
Signature _________________________ _ 
City/State ___________________ Zip ___ _ 
Tel. ______________ o you need nonviolence training? __ _ 
Name of affinity group ____________________ _ 
___ Please contact me concerning_pre-invasion vigils and actions. 
__ I would like to volunteer to work on the EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
NETWORK. 
___ Suggested donation of $2 or more to help meet the expenses involved in 
organizing this pledge. (Make checks payable to EMERGENCY 
RESPONSE NETWORK.) 
Please mail this pledge to: 
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE NETWORK 
American Friends Service Committee, 
2160 Lake Street, San Francisco, CA 94121 (415) 752-7766 
Resist Newsletter 
letters 
Combatting Homophobia 
Dear Friends: 
A few issues ago you published a 
gratuitous editorial that, after a few 
paragraphs of waffling and foot-
shuffling, came down against sup-
porting gay rights struggles within the 
military. I was not the only one to 
write in protest of the implicit homo-
phobia of those remarks. I see from 
the July/ August issue's page 2 article 
"We Are Everywhere!" that indeed 
your thinking is changed. That last 
paragraph deserves to be carved in 
stone for all future generations of 
strugglers. 
But there are apparently those who 
can't overcome their homophobia so 
successfully, namely the letter-writers 
whom you've answered so eloquently. 
The enclosed check will make up for 
one month of canceled pledges. It is 
sent with the hope that many more 
Resist supporters will respond in a 
similar fashion. 
Eric Gordon 
NY,NY 
ILLEGITIMATE AUIIIORITY 
Fut,dc'~ '1oc4-.J ~ ~ "61 
The Resist Newsletler is published ten 
times a year by Resist, Inc., 38 Union 
Square, Somerville, MA 02143. (617) 
623-5110. 
Resist staff: Ken Tangvik 
Meredith Smith 
Typesetting: Pam Mitchell, 
.Gay Community News 
Printing: Red Sun Press 
.... 
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Gulf War 
Continued from Page One 
This prescription would seem to fit 
the objective of the United States as 
formulated recently by Assistant 
Secretary of State Richard Murphy, 
who told a congressional committee 
that "a victory by either side is neither 
militarily achievable nor strategically 
desirable." 1 Since last fall, though, 
Washington's strategic desire to see no 
victor in the Gulf war has required a 
greater U.S. political and even military 
intervention on Iraq's behalf. "We 
want to keep Iraq in the field and get 
the war ended, n was how one State 
Department official characterized 
Washington's definition of neutrality. 2 
Washington's neutrality has been ex-
tremely flexible from the beginning of 
this war. Iraq relied heavily on Western 
intelligence evaluations of Iranian 
military capabilities when it invaded 
Iran in September 1980, and leading 
Iranian counterrevolutionary figures 
such as General Gholam Ali Oveissi 
visited Washington and Baghdad in the 
weeks prior to the war. 
Once full-scale war erupted, U.S. 
military involvement in the region, if 
not with the combatants themselves, 
became significant. Four days after the 
Iraqi invasion, on September 26, 1980, 
the CIA station chief in Saudi Arabia 
dispatched an urgent but vague 
message that the kingdom's leaders 
wanted U.S. military help. High level 
Carter administration officials met to 
assemble a series of options and debate 
which one they would like the Saudis to 
request. Defense Secretary Harold 
Brown and National Security Advisor 
Zbigniew Brzezinski saw the crisis as 
an opportunity to transfer to Saudi 
Arabia 40 F-14 figher planes from the 
aircraft carrier U .S.S. Eisenhower, 
already in the Arabian Sea, a similar 
number of F-15 fighters from U.S. air 
bases, and to send several hundred 
U.S. military technicians to operate 
Hawk anti-aircraft missiles there. In 
the view of some military officers, the 
war gave the U.S. leverage to extract 
more intimate Saudi collaboration with 
the long-term build-up of U.S. military 
forces in the region. 
Secretary of State Edmund S. 
Muskie took a more cautious tack, 
arguing that a major military inter-
vention in the Gulf would undermine 
assertions of U.S. neutrality in the war 
and violate the mutual nonintervention 
pledge the administration had made in 
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a meeting between Muskie and Soviet 
Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko 
on September 25. The debate was com-
plicated by intelligence reports that 
Oman and Saudi Arabia were about to 
allow Iraq to launch attacks from their 
airfields. 
On September 28, Brown, Brzezinski 
and Muskie agreed that USAF Air-
borne Warning and Control Aircraft 
(A WACs) should be sent immediately 
and were assured by Pentagon officials 
that F- l 4s from the USS Eisenhower 
could reach Saudi Arabia in less than 
two hours if needed. General David 
Jones, chairman of the U.S. Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, happened to be in 
Saudi Arabia at the time. He was 
directed to get a formal Saudi request 
for the AW A Cs and to dissaude them 
and the Omanis from allowing Iraq to 
use their facilities. 3 
By October 9, four U.S. Air Force 
(USAF) AW A Cs were providing 24 
hour-a-day coverage of Iraqi and 
Iranian battle movements northward 
as far as Dizful and scanning Iran's oil 
terminal on Kharg Island and its oil 
fields along the Gulf Coast. U.S. 
military personnel screened all the in-
telligence gathered, passing on to the 
Saudis only what the U.S. considered 
necessary for their defense. Another 
carrier battle group joined the USS 
Eisenhower in the Arabian Sea, and 
within three weeks the number of U.S., 
French, British and Australian war-
ships in the area had doubled from 30 
to 60. A U.S. ground radar station 
flown in to Saudi Arabia enabled ''all 
American units there to talk to each 
other, to talk to the fleet centered on 
two aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea 
and to communicate with American 
military headquarters in Europe.'' The 
official number of U.S. military per-
sonnel there had jumped from around 
400 to around 800 in the weeks since 
the war began. 4 
The dispatch of the USAF AW ACs 
led directly to the Reagan administra-
tion decision in early 1981 to sell five 
AW A Cs to Saudi Arabia as the center-
piece of an integrated regional air 
defense system built to U.S. specifica-
tions to host any eventual intervention 
by the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force. 
The AW A Cs agreement, according to 
military analyst Anthony Cordesman, 
provided each Saudi air base with the 
''service facilities, refueling capability, 
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parts and key munitions in place to ac-
cept over-the-horizon reinforcements 
for [70] USAF F-15 fighters. No con-
ceivable improvement in U.S. airlift or 
USAF rapid deployment and 'base 
basing' capability could come close to 
giving the U.S. this rapid and effective 
reinforcement capability. "s An added 
advantage was that the Sa.udis paid for 
it all. 
"55-45 Percent Neutrality" 
Under Reagan, the AWACs-cen-
tered military construction proceeded 
apace, mainly in Saudi Arabia but also 
in Oman and Bahrain. The U.S. also 
endorsed the efforts of the Saudi-led 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to 
integrate the Gulf states' air defenses 
into a single network. Policy in the 
Gulf war continued to be one of pro-
fessed neutrality. The temptation to 
lure Baghdad away from the Soviet 
Union, which had cut off arms supplies 
to Iraq, was tempered by a concern not 
to alienate Tehran any further, since 
Iran remained the "strategic prize" in 
the region. One White House official 
candidly described the resulting 
balance recently as a "55-45 percent 
neutrality" in favor of Iraq. 6 Early on, 
in March 1981, Secretary of State Alex-
ander Haig told Congress he noted 
"some shift" in Iraq's policy reflecting 
a "greater sense of concern about the 
behavior of Soviet imperialism in the 
Middle East. m Several weeks later, the 
State Department lifted a freeze on the 
sale of five Boeing passenger aircraft to 
Iraq, and Assistant Secretary of State 
Morris Draper met top Iraqi officials 
in Baghdad. In 1982, the administra-
tion removed Iraq from the list of 
countries officially regarded as sup-
porting "international terrorism," 
paving the way for credits and exports. 
In April 1982 the administration 
allowed Iraq to purchase between six 
and twelve LlOO transport aircraft 
"for civilian use. " 8 When Iran turned 
the tide of the war in June-July 1982, 
the State Department announced that 
the U.S. was prepared to hold joint 
military exercises with states in the 
region.9 Early in 1983, by which time 
Iraq was staring bankruptcy in the 
face, the administration granted some 
$400 million in credit guarantees for 
Continued on next page 
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Gulf War 
Continued from Page Three 
the export of U.S. wheat and other 
agricultural commodities to Iraq. This 
not only supplied Iraq with badly 
needed foodstuffs; more significantly, 
it demonstrated political and financial 
support to other prospective creditors, 
including Arab and European govern-
ments and international banks. 
The fall of 1983 posed again, as in 
September 1980, the question of direct 
U.S. military intervention in the war, 
or at least more explicit backing for 
Baghdad. Against a background of 
reports that Iraq was losing the war of 
attrition, the National Security Council 
decided in October to continue an of-
ficial policy of "military neutrality" 
while informing U.S. allies in Europe 
and the Gulf that an Iraqi def eat 
"would be contrary to U.S. interests." 
Five Ways to Tilt 
This further "tilt" towards Iraq 
took five different forms. First, the 
U.S. encouraged its allies to make ma-
jor weaons deliveries to Iraq. Ironical-
ly, at the same time the Soviet Union 
had resumed arms supplies to Iraq 
which it had cut off when Iraq invaded 
Iran. Washington dropped altogether 
its reservations about the French deci-
sion to "loan" Iraq five Super Eten-
dard jet fighters equipped with Exocet 
anti-ship missiles for Baghdad's 
planned tanker war, and carefully ig-
nored a major French airlift of 
weapons in October. Second, 
Washington encouraged Iraq's Arab 
allies to resume financial assistance to 
Baghdad. High level State and Defense 
Department emissaries toured the Gulf 
in October, December, February and 
again in April. Washington also en-
dorsed the participation of U.S. banks 
and construction companies in several 
schemes to increase Iraqi oil exports by 
building new pipelines through Jordan 
and Saudi Arabia. Third, Washington 
began pressuring allies and clients -
including Israel, South Korea and 
Great Britain - to halt all military 
related sales of weapons or spares to 
Iran, and by June the administration 
was bragging through its favored col-
umnists that supplies to Iran had 
"dried up." 10 
Fourth, the Reagan administration 
played along with the Iraqi tanker war 
talk. In response to Iranian statements 
that it would permit no oil exports 
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from the Gulf if its own exports were 
cut off, Reagan warned on October 20, 
1983, that ''the free world'' could not 
''stand by and allow anyone to close 
the Straits of Hormuz and the Persian 
Gulf." More recently, after Iraqi and 
Iranian warplanes had hit some dozen 
tankers in the Gulf, Reagan backed 
Iraq even more explicitly. He declared 
that "the enemy's commerce an,d trade 
is a fair target," while Iran's attacks 
against the ships of third party allies of 
Baghdad, and Tehran's refusal to ne-
gotiate a settlement, placed its tactics 
'' beyond bounds.'' 1 1 
Fifth, the administration ordered 
further planning for U.S. military in-
tervention in the event of an Iraqi col-
lapse. After the Marine barracks in 
Lebanon were bombed in late Octo-
ber, Defense Secretary Weinberger told 
a congressional committee that proof 
of Iranian involvement would justify 
U.S. military aid to Iraq. Washington 
announced in February that its war-
ships in and near the Gulf had orders 
to shoot any aircraft approaching 
within five miles. On February 26, 
1984, the guided missile destroyer USS 
Lawrence fired on an Iranian P3 patrol 
plane when it flew within two and a 
half miles of the Lawrence. 12 As Iran 
claimed success in taking Iraq's Maj-
noon Islands oil field, a "high-ranking 
administration official'' told the 
Philadelphia Inquirer that the ad-
ministration was prepared to send 
ground troops to the Gulf. 1 3 In late 
March the New York Times reported 
from Baghdad that "Western Euro-
pean diplomats assume that the United 
States now exchanges some intelligence 
on Iran with Iraq, 14 and Saddam Hus-
sein seemed to confirm this in early 
May when he told a Kuwaiti newspaper 
that ''we have benefitted from the 
AWACs in lraq." 15 
When the State Department's 
Richard Murphy visited the Gulf in 
April, he was accompanied by Rear 
Admiral John Poindexter, head of the 
Crisis Pre-planning Group within the 
NSC. Murphy's and Poindexter's mes-
sage to the ruling families was that any 
U.S. military intervention on their be-
half against Iran would require a 
public invitation and full U.S. access to 
their bases. Their mission was to ob-
tain Gulf states' permission to store ad-
ditional ammunition, fuel and wea-
pons for use by a U.S. intervention 
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force. U.S. military commanders had 
long maintained that the new Central 
Command (as the Rapid Deployment 
Force is now called) required land-
based facilities and headquarters in the 
Arabian Peninsula, and the escalating 
war against the tankers represented 
another opportunity to secure Saudi 
acquiesence. 
There are signs, though, that the ad-
ministration remains divided over how 
far to escalate U.S. intervention behind 
Iraq in order to consolidate the U.S. 
military presence in the region. Some 
officials complain about Saudi re-
sistance to a larger U.S. ground pre-
sence there, while others favor a more 
cautious approach. "Arab reluctance 
will save us from our own 
impetuosity," was how one State 
Department official put it. 16 European 
governments have also warned 
Washington against indulging its im-
pulse to "bash" Iran. 11 As a result, the 
U.S. contented itself to send Saudi 
Arabia new "improved" A WACs able 
to track ships as well as aircraft, 400 
largely symbolic Stinger anti-aircraft 
missiles and, more significantly, a 
USAF KC-10 aerial tanker. This was 
not needed to refuel the AW A Cs or 
Saudi F-15s. Several smaller KC-135s 
already there were handling this task. 
The KC-10, though, would enable U.S. 
fighter bombers based on carriers in 
the Arabian Sea to attack Iranian tar-
gets in the northern Gui f. 
The latest crisis has also forced 
Kuwait to re-evaluate its military ties 
with Washington. That country had 
until now declined to join the 
U .S.-sponsored air defense network 
based around the AWACs. A U.S. 
Central Command survey team visited 
Kuwait in June, and at the end of the 
month the administration announced 
Kuwait would buy millions of dollars 
worth of military equipment and 
would tie in with the Saudi air defense 
system. 18 Regular flights of USAF 
C-48 cargo jets into Gulf airports sug-
gest that some degree of pre-
positioning of military equipment and 
supplies has been going on. 19 
At the same time, Washington has 
stepped up its tacit intervention on 
Iraq's behalf by providing U.S. war-
ships as tanker escorts, starting in the 
third week of May. Officially, the 
escorts are for tankers chartered by the 
Navy's Military Sealift Command to 
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provide fuel for U.S. forces at sea and 
abroad. The Pentagon asserts that only 
four U.S. warships have been opera-
ting in the Gulf, but observers there 
believe there may be as many as 12. 20 
The escorts are operating only in the 
southern, Arabian side of the Gulf, 
thus threatening to repulse Iranian but 
not Iraqi attacks; there have been no 
sightings of U.S. tanker escorts in the 
vicinity of Kharg Island. 
Washington's current view appears 
to be that any escalation of the tanker 
war should be handled initially by the 
air forces of the various Gulf states. 
''The feeling here is that they should 
get bloodied first," said one U.S. of-
ficial. 21 With 300 modern fighters (185 
of these belonging to Saudi Arabia), 
these forces should be more than a 
match for Iran's 60 to 70 vintage Phan-
toms and handufl of F-14s. The lack of 
a direct Iranaian response to the loss of 
a Phantom in a June 5 dogfight with 
Saudi planes over the middle of the 
Gulf has encouraged the Pentagon in 
this view. As in the June 5 incident, 
U.S. involvement in any such confron-
tation would be considerable, with the 
AW ACs providing intelligence and 
flight guidance and the aerial tankers 
providing refueling. Pentagon officials 
reportedly gave "mixed reviews" to 
the "Peninsula Shield" military exer-
cises held by the Gulf Cooperation 
Council in late 1983. ''The maneuvers 
showed us how far the Gulf states have 
come, but also how badly they need 
us," was one U.S. official's verdict. 22 
Other U.S. regional allies outside the 
Gulf are also involved. In late June, 
Saudi defense officials met with Jor-
dan's King Hussein, Pakistan's dic-
tator Zia ul-Haq and the Egyptian 
chief of staff to discuss the war. 23 All 
three countries provide pilots, officers 
and military technicians to the Saudi 
and other Gulf military establishments. 
There are two scenarios which pose 
the danger of direct U.S. military inter-
vention against Iran. One involves the 
likely consequences of an Iranian at-
tack on U.S. warships in the Gulf, 
especially in their tanker escort func-
tion, or against Saudi oil installations. 
This sort of incident would probably 
shift the balance in Washington de-
cisively in favor of those who would 
like to repair the post-Lebanon prestige 
of the U.S. at Iran's expense. Iran's 
very cautious behavior in the tanker 
war so far makes such a development 
Effigies of Saddam Hussein in Teheran 
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unlikely but possible. 
Prospects for such escalation depend 
much more on the outcome of the 
ground war, and particularly of the 
long-awaited Iranian attack on Basra. 
If Iraqi defenses hold, officials in 
Washington expect that increased oil 
exports through new pipelines after an-
other year or so will enable the Saddam 
Hussein regime to repair its economy 
and political base. 24 On the other hand 
if Iran scores a significant 
breakthrough, Washington expects its 
long-awaited "invitation" from 
Riyadh to intervene directly. This 
would involve sending between two 
and four USAF F-15 squadrons to be 
based in Saudi Arabia. From there an 
air offensive against Iranian air bases 
and troop concentrations would enable 
Iraq to hold its own in the land battles. 
"I feel confident that within mintues, 
we could certainly stabilize that situa-
tion border-wide," one U.S. military 
official said in May. 22 This would re-
present the penultimate step in the ''in-
cremental'' policy of escalation that 
Washington has followed for the last 
year of this war. Do those U.S. of-
ficials who talk of an intervention 
lasting ''minutes'' remember that this 
war was supposed to be over in a few 
weeks when Iraq sent its forces over the 
border in September 1980? 
Joe Stork and Martha Wenger are 
editor and assistant editor of MERIP 
Reports. 
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Grassroots Report: CAP A 
Last February Resist gave CAP A a $488 
grant for the production of a slide show. 
Rachel Wyon and David Truscello 
We are teaching people of all ages. 
People who never had the opportunity to 
go to a school. We do this because we 
consider education a right that we will not 
wait to exercise. That is why in the midst 
of this conflict, in spite of the suffering, 
we are offering classes beneath the trees, 
teaching students as our territory is bom-
barded with mortars and bombed by 
helicopters sent by your government. 
ANDES representative 
- Marta Alicia Rivera 
at the MT A Conference on Civil and 
Human Rights, January, 1984. 
In the complex debate over U.S. policy 
in Central America, it is often difficult to 
get back to basics. "CAPA - Educators 
in Support of ANDES" has been working 
to provide basic information about the ef-
fects on education of the U.S. maintained 
war in El Salvador, and about the efforts 
of the Salvadoran opposition forces or-
ganized under the umbrella of the FDR-
FMLN to prepare their people for par-
ticipatory democracy in spite of the 
government. 
CAP A - Comite de Apoyo Pro-Alfa-
betizacion (The Literacy Support Com-
mittee) was formed two years ago by a 
group of people from various nations 
who wanted to help inform people inter-
nationally about the literacy campaign or-
ganized and promoted by the National 
Association of Salvadoran Educations 
(ANDES 21 DE JUNIO). The literacy 
campaign, begun in 1981, is making it 
possible for the Salvadoran people to 
''read about their own reality in order to 
write their own history." ANDES has 
taken its work to the refugee camps and 
cooperatives of Central America and the 
areas of El Salvador controlled by the 
FDR-FMLN. Currently, about 25,000 
people are involved in literacy and post-
literacy classes as learners or popular 
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COMITE DE APOYO PRO-ANDES' 
volunteer teachers. (Support committees 
like CAP A are spreading the news of the 
success throughout France, Sweden, 
Canada and the United States.) 
In Boston, CAP A has completed many 
support projects. It has produced a slide 
show about the literacy campaign and 
uses it as an educational tool in schools, 
teachers' unions and churches. It has sent 
speakers to teachers' conferences and 
conferences on peace issues. It has helped 
organize a tour of North American 
teachers to Nicaragua. And in January of 
1984, CAPA helped anchor the East-
Coast ANDES tour of Marta Alicia 
Rivera, the union's representative in the 
United States. The tour of Marta Alicia 
successfully carried the Salvadoran 
teachers' urgent message of peace to 
unions and churches, schools, and media 
in cities from Boston to Burlington VT, 
and from New York to Washington. 
As a result of the tour, CAP A and 
ANDES have developed relations with 
the Massachusetts Teachers' Association 
and the Boston Teachers' Union. Both 
unions lent their support to the ANDES 
tour. And the BTU (AFT Local 16) ap-
proved a resolution supporting the efforts 
of ANDES and their literacy work, 
donating $1,000 to purchase educational 
materials to be sent to ANDES in 
Nicaragua through Oxfam America's 
Resist Newsletter 
Tools for Peace Campaign. 
On June 21, 1984, Boston area teachers 
and students and their friends celebrated 
together with members of CAP A to com-
memorate the 20 years of organized strug-
gle of the Salvadoran teaching profession 
under the leadership of ANDES. The 
event, which included Latin food, local 
musicians, breakdancers from Chelsea 
and Mission Hill middle schools, and the 
CAP A slide show, was a fund raiser for 
the CAP A sponsored Educators Tour to 
Nicaragua. At this event CAP A an-
nounced its new name: "CAP A - Comite 
de Apoyo Pro-ANDES - Educations in 
Support of ANDES". This name reflects 
the fact that ANDES is becoming increas-
ingly recognized throughout North 
America and Europe where many 
ANDES solidarity committees have been 
set up, similar to CAP A. The name also 
indicates more accurately the work of 
CAP A, which supports both the Literacy 
Campaign and the very important union 
work carried out inside El Salvador. Dur-
ing its 20 years of struggle, ANDES has 
won the respect and recognition of the 
people of El Salvador, but is has also been 
targetted by the government and re-
pressed severely. Since 1979, 323 teachers 
have been murdered, 68 teachers have 
been captured and are now disappeared, 
and many teachers have been arrested, 
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with three currently in prison. Even to-
day, with new "democratic" government 
of Jose Napolion Duarte elected in May 
of 1984, ANDES continues to be har-
assed. Its union offices have been search-
ed and files were taken illegally by govern-
ment forces; the homes of union leaders 
are under surveillance; and almost 5,000 
teachers are unemployed. 
With its 20th anniversary, however, 
members of ANDES 21 DE JUNIO both 
in El Salvador and in exile celebrated the 
many gains of the past two decades: signi-
ficant salary increases, health insurance 
for teachers and their families, retirement 
after 30 years of service, economic aid for 
families of teachers who were victims of 
the repression. The most recent victory, in 
April of this year, is a salary increase of 
110 colones (about $40) per month for all 
teachers and administrative employees of 
the Minstry of Education. This increase is 
particularly meaningful because wages 
have been frozen for the past several 
years. 
In addition to continuing to do educa-
tion work and raise funds and materials 
for ANDES, CAP A is currently develop-
ing a new slide show of the teachers' tour 
to Nicaragua (August '84), and helping to 
promote the November 6 referendum on 
U.S. policy in Central America. CAP A is 
also embarking on another major tour 
project. The North American teachers 
who visited Nicaragua laid the ground 
work for a U.S. tour of representatives of 
the Federation of Central American 
Teachers Organizations (FOMCA). The 
formation of FOMCA in 1982, brought 
together the teachers' unions of El 
Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
#170 
Nicaragua, Honduras, and Panama. Its 
fundamental objective is to promote 
education and to defend the rights of 
educators in Central America in the face 
of repression supported by the U.S. 
government and the direct U.S. inter-
vention. 
Although modelled on the East Coast 
ANDES Tour of last winter, the FOMCA 
tour will require greater fundraising, out-
reach, and logistical coordination because 
it is a national tour involving a number of 
teacher representatives. But it is impor-
tant that as many as possible in the United 
States involve themselves in the decisions 
their country makes about war and peace 
in Central America. The FOMCA tour is 
an ambitious project to aid that involve-
ment by providing access to basic infor-
mation through meetings with Central 
American teachers themselves. 
If you would like to help, or would like 
more information about the tour project, 
or about CAPA's work, please contact 
Rachel Wyon, c/ o CAP A 1151 Mass. 
Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138. 
The Central America Teachers 
Organizations support the work of 
ANDES and its 20 year struggle for jus-
tice for the teachers and for all trade 
unions in El Salvador. The National 
Teachers' Platform for 1984-85 ends with 
two demands that CAP A would like to 
emphasize to the people of the United 
States: To search for a negotiated political 
solution to the conflict between the gov-
ernment of El Salvador and the FDR-
FMLN; and To cease immediately the in-
tervention of the U.S. government in El 
Salvador. 
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Gulf War 
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March 1984 claimed to have halted an 
attempt by a Minnesota firm, E & F 
Marketing, Inc., to ship $7 million in 
M-60 tank parts to Iran. ( Wall Street 
Journal, March 28, 1984) 
11. WP, June 1, 1984 
12. WP, February 29, 1984. 
13. Philadelphia Inquirer, 
February 24, 1984. 
14. NYT, March 29, 1984. 
15. Financial Times, May 12, 1984. 
16. MEPS, June 18, 1984. 
17. WP, May 31 and June 6, 1984. 
18. A Kuwaiti request for Stinger 
missiles was rejected by Washington as 
not "suitable" to Kuwaiti defense 
needs. How those needs differed from 
Saudi needs was not made clear. The 
real reason may be that the inventory 
of Stingers had been completely 
depleted, and the Kuwaiti request 
could only be met by delving into U.S. 
stocks. ( Washington Post, June 20, 
1984) The Kuwaitis responded by 
entertaining an off er from the Soviet 
Union for some $2-300 million worth 
of air defense weapons systems. 
19. London Times, June 8, 1984. 
20. Ibid. 
21. NYT, May 27, 1984. 
22. MEPS, January 13, 1984. 
23. NYT, June 27, 1984. 
24. The major new pipeline option 
now under consideration would run 
540 miles from Iraqi oil fields to the 
Jordanian port of Aqaba. Washington 
has lent critical political and economic 
support to this project. Politically, the 
U.S. has passed on to Baghdad "verbal 
assurances" that Israel would not at-
tack the pipeline, which would run 
close to the Israeli border at its ter-
minal point. Economically the ad-
ministration persuaded an initially 
reluctant Export-Import Bank to 
guarantee $425 million in U.S. com-
mercial loans for the project. Iraq ex-
pects to raise another $500 million 
from European sources. The project 
includes a $570 million contract for 
Bechtel Corporation, the corporate 
nest of Secretary of State George 
Shultz and Secretary of Defense 
Caspar Weinberger. Ex-Im Bank sup-
port was reportedly clinched by an 
Iraqi agreement to order $100 million 
worth of U .S.-made steel pipe instead 
of cheaper West German or Japanese 
steel for the pipeline itself. (New York 
Times July 16, 1984) 
25. Newsday, May 20, 1984. 
Page Seven 
Black New York Action Committee, 
1878 Adam Clayton Powell Jr. Blvd., 
New York, NY 10026 
The Black New York Action Com-
mittee is a small Harlem-based collec-
tive consisting of Black people from 
all walks of life. There are profes-
sionals, workers, students and retirees 
among the membership. The organi-
zation has been in existence since 1976 
when a group of Black activists came 
together out of a desire to respond in 
some way to the New York City fiscal 
crisis taking place at that time. The 
impact of this crisis upon Black, non-
white and poor people was devas-
tating and they felt that a clear 
analysis was necessary. Much of their 
early practive consisted of educational 
and agitational activities around the 
state-appointed Emergency Financial 
Control Board and the Municipal 
Assistance Corporation. These agen-
cies had, in essence, usurped the 
governing authority in New York Ci-
ty. As the committee worked in the 
Harlem community, they were in-
creasingly convinced of the need to 
become involved, as an organization, 
in those struggles going on around 
day-to-day needs of the people, and 
where there was no struggle, to help 
initiate it. Those areas of concern 
were housing, education, drugs, 
health, police brutality, etc. They also 
saw that the rebuilding of Harlem and 
communities like it would require a 
number of skills and a lot of informa-
tion for community people. Their 
answer to these needs is the Fannie 
Lou Hamer Institute, a cultural and 
educational center which they hope 
will meet these needs as they build it. 
One of their activities through the In-
stitute is the "Reels In Focus" Film 
and Discussion Series. They hope to 
do two things with this series. First, 
they offer educational and infor-
mative experiences for neighborhood 
people. Second, the dialogue that 
develops from these film showings 
helps them to get an understanding of 
neighborhood people's political level 
and concerns. This in turn helps them 
to better understand how to proceed 
with organizational efforts. Resist's 
grant of $400 went toward the pur-
chase of a 16mm projector for the 
film series. 
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Vermonters Organized for Clean-Up, 
P.O. Box 190, Williamstown, VT 
05679 
Presently, there are 27 communities 
in Vermont that have toxic waste 
stored, buried or otherwise kept un-
safe and the government and industry 
have shown little or no interest in 
dealing with these serious health 
hazards. Recently, several activists 
came together from a grassroots 
organization to address this problem. 
Vermonters Organized for Clean-Up 
has been organizing informational 
forums in towns where the hazardous 
waste is located and they have pushed 
to get the sites fenced off. They have 
also successfully initated and 
established citizens' action toxic waste 
organizations in these towns by pro-
viding leadership training and 
organizing skills. Some of the long 
range goals of the group are: to un-
cover more toxic waste existing in the 
state; to create an awareness of the 
hazards of disposing toxic chemicals 
in landfills; to create awareness and to 
disseminate information on health 
hazards due to enviornmental pollu-
tion and toxic waste specifically; to 
create awareness on household hazar-
dous waste and to develop a state-
wide pick-up system; to gather infor-
mation from the EPA and universities 
and to organize and diseminate this 
material; to establish a workable 
organization of citizens that will be a 
pressuring wedge to force the govern-
ment to act and make industry comply 
with existing pollution laws; to 
publicize routes of trucks carrying 
hazardous waste; to make haulers dis-
play their placards on their trucks so 
that people can know what is being 
hauled; and to foster basic human 
rights and build strength in persons to 
demand respect. Resist's grant of $300 
went towards the purchase of a copier 
so that requests for information can 
be fulfilled rapidly and efficiently. 
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Central America Solidarity Coalition, 
1016 N. 9th St., Milwaukee, WI 53233 
In January, 1979, a group of 
Milwaukeeans who were knowledge-
able about the conflict in Nicaragua 
formed a group called the Committee 
to Aid Nicaraguan Democracy 
(CANO). The committee's goal was to 
educate the public about the nature of 
the Nicaraguan revolution, and to 
support the Nicaraguan people 
through the provision of 
humanitarian aid. Throughout 1979, 
many successful educational events 
were held, the Committee's member-
ship grew, and several shipments of 
medical supplies and materials for the 
literacy crusade were sent to 
Nicaragua. In 1980, CANO members 
saw the need to expand the commit-
tee's area of interest to El Salvador. 
The group thus became the Commit-
tee to Aid Nicaraguan Democ-
racy /Committee in Solidarity with 
the people of El Salvador 
(CAND/CISPES), and they included 
El Salvador in their educational work. 
In 1982, the membership decided that 
a rgional perspective was essential to 
convey the nature of the conflict in 
Central America. They then became 
the Central America Solidarity Coali-
tion (CASC). Their goal is to halt 
United States intervention in Central 
America and they work toward this 
goal by: building informed solidarity 
in their community for the peoples of 
Central America; encouraging elected 
representatives to work for a new 
foreign policy which would grant the 
right of self-determination to the na-
tions of Central America; and pro-
viding humanitarian aid to the Central 
American people. Recently, CASC 
decided that they needed to replace 
their brochure with one that is up-to-
date. The brochure will be used for 
educational outreach, membership-
building and fund-raising. Resist's 
grant of $260 helped pay the produc-
tion costs of the new brochure. 
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